Intoduction
This book represents a brief Ludwig Wittgenstein’s biography while his staying and living in Great Britain, mostly in England, in Cambridge. This work was born as a part of my doctoral dissertation which investigated the role of language in the constitution of reality in late Wittgenstein’s philosophy, however, working on my research I understood the necessity of tracing the influence not only of Russell, Frege, and previous continental philosophers (for instance, Augustine, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Spengler, Weininger, Tolstoy) on the development of his thought, but his English environment in general — the place where he spent the most of his life. Here I attempt to understand why despite his deep and sincere adoration for Vienna fin-de-siècle he was never thought to return there back to settle there forever. However, in the periods between the wars and after WWII he was happy to visit Vienna whenever possible. But, finally, but not surprisingly, he decided to face his pass away in England surrounded by people who supported and loved him.
The book is divided into three chapters. The first chapter discusses young Wittgenstein’s first move to Manchester to study engineering, and his turn to the problems of mathematics and logic. In Wittgenstein’s correspondence, I have found that Russell was wrong in his recollections saying that it was he who advised young Ludwig to read Frege’s book. Instead, it was Frege with whom Ludwig had already encountered personally advised Wittgenstein to apply to Bertrand Russell. In this chapter, I discuss briefly the intellectual atmosphere in Cambridge in the first decade of the twentieth century which gives a key to a better understanding of the origin of analytic philosophy and interest in the philosophy of language. It is worth mentioning that Wittgenstein criticizes Darwinism, Ogden’s study of the influence of language upon thought, and the entire intellectual atmosphere in England. The second half of this chapter discusses the influence of the ideas of Russell and their relationship as crucially important to understand the fact that Wittgenstein, had accepted several Russell’s ideas, but soon rejected them and criticised them in detail. According to a lot of correspondence available nowadays we can reconstruct not only the environment of thought in Cambridge at the beginning and the first half of the 20th century but to find some very personal, subjective grounds for the changes in the relationship between thinkers, and misunderstandings between them. Such a kind of biographical-historical reconstruction does not interfere but helps us to understand better the origin, development, and criticism of philosophical ideas and theories. In this context, the personal relationship between Russell and Wittgenstein, their friendship for more than 30 years, and mutual assistance, both intellectual and business, played a big role in the development and formation of both philosophers as philosophers. Even mutual disagreements and criticism of ideas over time helped them to see the shortcomings and sometimes even complete failure of their theses and statements. In this part I describe in detail the role of Russell in Wittgenstein’s life: first meeting and inspiration to do philosophy, support in studies, assistance in the publication of Wittgenstein’s first book, support, and facilitation in returning to Cambridge in 1929, obtaining PhD degree and receiving Trinity College grant. Second, I consider the fundamental points of philosophical disagreements between the two philosophers and Wittgenstein’s critique of Russell’s ideas.
Chapter two analyses in detail Wittgenstein’s ‘Cambridge period’ from his return to Cambridge in 1929 until his decease in 1951. Within the ‘Cambridge period’, scholars usually distinguish the ‘middle’ (1929–1936) and the ‘late’ (1936–1951) periods. The trigger point of Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge and philosophy was his visit to Brouwer’s lecture on ‘Mathematics, Science, and Language’ in Vienna in March 1928. Dutch mathematician Brouwer influenced not only Wittgenstein’s ability to do philosophy again but also the development of some of his ideas. Namely, for Brouwer, language was a natural development of the social history of human beings. With the help of his friends, F. P. Ramsey, J. M. Keynes, G. E. Moore, and B. Russell, in 1929 Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge. I argue that this was the crucial turning point in his philosophy that led to the revision of some of his ideas. Wittgenstein returned from self-isolation in remote villages of Lower Austria to the intellectual academic environment, where he could discuss his ideas with intellectual interlocutors and receive their valuable remarks and comments. This chapter is organised in chronological order: it describes the very ‘early’ middle period of 1929–1935 involving the development of Wittgenstein’s ‘phenomenology’ and the origin of the ‘language-games’ concept in the Blue and Brown Books; 1935–1936 period of ‘romantic’ enthusiasm for Soviet Russia and a trip there; Wittgenstein’s life and work during the WWII-time; resign from teaching in Cambridge in 1947 to final version of Philosophical Investigations. I suggest that the ‘romantic areal’ about the USSR was formed by Wittgenstein’s predilection for Russian poetry and literature of the 19th century, i.e., Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Pushkin. Analysing the development of Wittgenstein’s ideas on language in his Cambridge period, I mention the possible influence of Nicolas Bakhtin, professor of philology, with whom Wittgenstein discussed his works, including Tractatus, Philosophical Investigations, the idea of language as an activity and meanings dependent on context. Also, I touch upon the topic of the possibility of Marxism’s influence on Wittgenstein’s life and thought which lets me build a bridge to the next chapter where, in chapter three, I trace the influence of Wittgenstein’s friends and colleagues on the development of his ideas, and the basic transformation of Wittgenstein’s ideas on language, and its role in the constitution of reality. Many of Wittgenstein’s friends and pupils helped him to develop his thoughts on language and reality not explicitly but using conversations, dialog, Ramsey (symbolism in mathematics, intuitionism), Sraffa (Marxist ideas, criticism of Wittgenstein’s previous ideas in Tractatus, turn to ‘anthropological’ way of considering philosophical matters, turn to ‘living language’). According to my research, Moore’s ideas were more objects of Wittgenstein’s criticism, however, they gave a huge impetus to the development of his ideas on the topics of knowledge, reliability, certainty, and belief. Keynes, Drury, Rhees, von Wright, and other Wittgenstein’s friends and pupils did not influence Wittgenstein’s thought explicitly, but they left many correspondences, notes, recorded lectures, and recollections that helped to restore Wittgenstein’s ideas most consistently, clarify controversial and incomprehensible passages.
Chapter 1 Young Wittgenstein before 1929
1. 1 First stay in Cambridge before WWI
1.1.1 1908–1913 Period
We know about Wittgenstein’s stay in Cambridge for the first time before World War I principally from a few numbers of sources: David Pinsent’s diaries, Wittgenstein’s correspondence with Pinsent, Russell, and others (BW 1980),[1] Russell’s letters to Ottoline Morell, and Wittgenstein’s family correspondence. Griffin (1992, 84) wrote that von Wright (1990) collected and published all the entries that concern Wittgenstein, together with Pinsent’s letters to Wittgenstein, correspondence between Wittgenstein and Pinsent’s mother after Pinsent’s death, and a brief sketch of Pinsent’s life and background by his sister, Anne Pinsent Keynes.
In 1908 young Ludwig Wittgenstein, on his father’s advice, went to England to study engineering. Earlier in 1906 after finishing school and earning his matriculation certificate, Wittgenstein wanted to stay in Vienna and study physics at Boltzmann mentorship (von Wright 1955, 529). Unfortunately, Boltzmann died by suicide in 1906 (see Chapter 2). Therefore, after reading Franz Reuleaux’s ‘Theoretische Kinematik’[2] Wittgenstein decided to move to Berlin’s Technische Hochschule in Charlottenburg to study engineering. However, he was not satisfied with his studies in Berlin and was looking for alternatives. In 1908 he enrolled in the College of Technology in Manchester. In the autumn of that year, he started his studies and practice at Manchester University as a research student in the Engineering Department working on the development of a ‘motorless’ aero-engine. Frege, in one of his letters to Wittgenstein, confirmed that Wittgenstein worked on the theory of aeroplanes.[3] Wittgenstein invented the novelconstruction of propellers. On 22 November 1910, he registered this invention at the patent office under, Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘Improvements in Propellers applicable for Aerial Machines.’ Patent No. 27.087, – AD 1910 GB.Thirty years later, another Austrian, Friedrich von Doblhoff, reinvented the engine without knowing of Wittgenstein’s work. The invention led to a completely new concept for a helicopter called Doblhoff/WNF 342 which was successfully tested for the first time in 1943. In developing the propeller, Wittgenstein faced some mathematical problems. And it piqued his interest more than the technical development of motors. Wittgenstein discussed mathematical problems with his colleagues in the engineering laboratory. Later, one of Wittgenstein’s pupils, suggested that Wittgenstein was seeking the truth all his life; ‘He sought the truth at first in engineering, then in mathematical logic’ (Hijab 2001, 314).
According to von Wright (1955, 530), Wittgenstein asked someone for a piece of advice to get acquainted with the literature on the foundations of mathematics and he was advised to read Bertrand Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics, first published in 1903; after reading that book Wittgenstein decided to write to Russell. According to von Wright (2001, 5), Wittgenstein was influenced by Russell’s study, and that let him apply to Frege’s works. In von Wright’s words, ‘It was probably it which led him to study the works of Frege. The “new” logic, which in Frege and Russell had two of its most brilliant representatives, became the gateway through which Wittgenstein entered philosophy’ (1955, 530). However, Russell was wrong, when he wrote in his 1951 (in Mind) obituary for Wittgenstein that Wittgenstein did not know Frege before he came to Cambridge (p. 298). Anscombe (1959, 12) was also mistaken believing that it was Russell who introduced Wittgenstein to Frege’s writings. In fact, it was conversely. According to Ludwig’s sister Hermine’s notes, it was Frege who advised Wittgenstein to go to Cambridge and study with Russell. Wittgenstein told von Wright that after he had decided to give up on studying engineering, he first went to Jena to meet Frege and discuss his subsequent plans with him (von Wright 1955, 530). Hermine wrote in her memoir (1981, 5) that in 1911 her brother was working on a philosophical work and he wanted to present it to Frege. It happened in the summer of 1911 when Wittgenstein stopped in Jena on his way from Vienna to England. Frege endorsed Wittgenstein’s philosophical thoughts and, also, advised him to continue his studies under Russell in Cambridge. In the preface to Tractatus, Wittgenstein wrote, ‘I will only mention that to the great works of Frege and the writings of my friend Bertrand Russell I owe in large measure the stimulation of my thoughts’ (1922, 23).
The years before WWI were the years of high intellectual activity in Cambridge, especially in the fields of logic and mathematics. G. E. Moore, one of the most influential logicians and philosophers in Cambridge at that time, published in 1899 The Nature of Judgement, in 1903 his famous Principia Ethica, the same year Review of Franz Brentano’s ‘The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong’, and Refutation of Idealism, in 1905-6 The Nature and Reality of the Objects of Perception. In 1903 G. Frege published the second volume of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. In 1910 B. Russell published the first volume of Principia Mathematica written together with A. N. Whitehead. Later Wittgenstein criticised their approach, ‘Through Russell, but especially through Whitehead, there entered into philosophy a false exactitude that is the worst enemy of real exactitude. At the bottom of this lies the erroneous belief that a calculus could be the metamathematical foundation of mathematics’ (BT 2005, 376e; Grundladen der Mathematik). It was the intellectual atmosphere in Cambridge in 1910 when young Wittgenstein arrived. Wittgenstein took an interest in the new logic represented by Frege and Russell. Wittgenstein already had a historical-philosophical background. Earlier he had read Schopenhauer, probably Kierkegaard and Hertz,Boltzmann, and Helmholtz, philosophical aspects of Reuleaux’s Kinematics of Machinery.
In 1912 Wittgenstein still had doubts about whether to continue his studies in aeronautics and engineering or to switch completely to philosophy. Russell advised him to write an essay on any subject. Russell was impressed from the very first sentence and asked Wittgenstein to devote himself to philosophy. Russell wrote in the letter to Ottoline Morell, dated 18 October 1911, about Wittgenstein. ‘He turned out to be a man who had learnt engineering at Charlottenburg, but during his course had acquired, by himself, a passion for the philosophy of math’s, and has now come to Cambridge on purpose to hear me’ (Russell cited in Nedo 2011, no pag.). At the beginning of June 1912, Wittgenstein was admitted by the Degree Committee of the Special Board for Moral Science as an Advanced Student to a research course at Trinity College and ‘Mr. Bertrand Russell’ was asked to ‘be kind enough to act as the Director and Supervisor of the Student.’[4] He studied Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics with Russell and Psychologyat Moore’s lectures. His tutors were, first, the mathematician J. W. L. Glaisher, and later W. M. Fletcher. Wittgenstein developed friendships with Russell, Whitehead, Moore, J. M. Keynes, and the mathematician G. H. Hardy. Moore recalled this story in the letter to F.A. Hayek.
[At] the beginning of the October term 1912, he came again to some of my psychology lectures; but he was very displeased with them because I was spending a great deal of time discussing Ward’s view that psychology did not differ from the Natural Sciences in subject-matter but only in point of view. He told me these lectures were very bad — that what I ought to do was to say what I thought, not to discuss what other people had thought; and he came no more to my lectures. But this did not prevent him from seeing a great deal of me. He was very anxious at the beginning of this year to improve the discussion of our philosophical society, which is called the Moral Science Club; and he actually persuaded the Club, with the help of the Secretary and me, to adopt a new set of rules and to appoint me as Chairman. He himself took a great part in these discussions. In this year both he and I were still attending Russell’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics; but W. used also to go for hours to Russell’s rooms in the evening to discuss Logic with him. Wittgenstein arranged to be coached in Logic by W. E. Johnson; but Johnson soon found that W. spent so much time in explaining his own views that he (Johnson) felt that it was more like being coached by W. than W. being coached by him; and Johnson therefore soon put an end to the arrangement (Moore cited in Nedo 2011, 9).
In 1912 Wittgenstein became a member of the Cambridge University Moral Science Club. In December 1912 Wittgenstein gave his first paper to the Moral Science Club on the subject ‘What is Philosophy?’ However, this situation was some kind of anecdotal when Wittgenstein already showed his eccentricity. As it was written in the record following the meeting ‘From the minutes of Moral Science Club’, dated 29.11.1912,
Mister Wittgenstein read a paper entitled ‘What is Philosophy?’ The paper lasted only about 4 minutes thus cutting the previous record established by Mr Tye by nearly two minutes. Philosophy was defined as all those primitive propositions which are assumed as true without proof by various sciences. This definition was much discussed but there was no general disposition to accept it. (WC 2008, 35)
Wittgenstein developed a close friendship with a mathematics student David Hume Pinsent. Wittgenstein continued his communication with Frege through both their correspondence and rare personal meetings. In 1912 he met Frege and left a note in his Notebooks duplicated in a letter to Russell (WC 2008, 35).
IV Alleegasse 16. Wien. 26.12.12.
[...] I had a long discussion with Frege about our theory of symbolism of which, I think, he roughly understood the general outline. He said he would think the matter over. The complex-problem is now clearer to me and I hope very much that I may solve it.
There is evidence in Russell’s correspondence that Wittgenstein was interested in the topic of the psychology of music in 1912–1913. Wittgenstein conducted some experimental research on the psychology of music and in May 1913 even introduced and exhibited an apparatus for the psychological investigation of rhythm. However, this event was consistent with his early studies of engineering. Wittgenstein tried to combine engineering inventions with his psychological and philosophical interests. Nevertheless, in the letter to Russell dated 1.7.1912, Wittgenstein spoke strangely enough about his work, ‘[…] I have to write a most absurd paper on rhythms for the psychological meeting on the 13th’ (Wittgenstein cited in McGuinness 2001, 30). Probably, Wittgenstein said that because he never liked, especially at a young age, to comply with the official requirement form of the final report of the results of his research.
[1] Briefe. Correspondence with B. Russell, G. E. Moore, J. M. Keynes, F. P. Ramsey, W. Eccles, P. Engelmann and L. von Ficker. Brian McGuinness and Georg Henrik von Wright eds., Joachim Schulte trans., Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp [BW 1980].
[2] Franz Reuleaux, Theoretische Kinematik. Braunschweig, 1875. (The Kinematics of Machinery, London, 1876).
[3] Frege-Wittgenstein Correspondence, Letter from 26.02.1918, p. 27.
[4] Letter from 5 June 1912 from J. M. Keynes, University Registrary, to M. W. Fletcher, Tutor at trinity College (in von Wright 1974, 1).
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